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SENAPATHI Report

Defence Dashboard

Maintained

The reference layer. Every figure carries its source and an as-of date; region status lines are Senapathi assessments, labelled as such. Snapshot dated 30 Oct 2026.

Defence budget FY26-27

₹7.85 L cr

+15.19% YoY

All-time-high Ministry of Defence allocation in Union Budget 2026-27, up 15.19% over FY 2025-26 Budgetary Estimates.

as of 2026-02-01 · source ↗

Indian Navy fleet strength

137 ships & subs

58 more under construction

Navy currently operates 137 ships and submarines plus 264 aircraft; 58 naval ships under construction as of 2025 (PRS analysis of Defence Demands for Grants 2026-27).

as of 2026-02-17 · source ↗

IAF fighter squadrons

29 sqns

vs 42 sanctioned

Fighter squadron strength dipped to 29 — against the sanctioned 42 — after the MiG-21's retirement on 26 Sep 2025.

as of 2025-09-26 · source ↗

Defence exports FY25-26

₹38,424 cr

+62.66% YoY

Record defence exports of ₹38,424 crore in FY 2025-26, up ₹14,802 crore (62.66%) over FY 2024-25's ₹23,622 crore.

as of 2026-04-02 · source ↗

Senapathi assessment

Region monitor

  • LAC / India-China border

    The thaw now has an official hole in it. On 22 October ITBP Director General Shatrujeet Kapoor told his own force that a face-off 'at several places' in Arunachal Pradesh 'is still on' — the first official Indian confirmation that the Upper Subansiri stand-off outlived both the 25 August Special Representatives round and the 6 September Vacha-Damai corps-commander meeting. Government sources put PLA tents six to seven kilometres inside India's perception of the LAC near Maja in the Taksing circle, with the Asaphila stand-off running since late July; the ITBP is stocking forward posts for 'Galwan-like situations' and building reinforced underground shelters, which is a winter posture. The MEA (23 October) said border areas 'get disturbed from time to time' when PLA troops deviate from 'established patrolling patterns' and referred the specifics to the MoD; Beijing (26 October) called its activity 'normal border patrol and control'. Whether the two new hotlines and the Joshimath/Tawang meeting points agreed in August are actually in use at Maja-Asaphila is the question the government has not answered; Army Chief Gen Dhiraj Seth's 27 October review at Joshimath and Mana and mechanised high-altitude training in Ladakh read as checks that the quieter sectors stay quiet. Two counter-currents on the Chinese side: Karakoram-2026 closed at Korla on 22 October with Pakistani regulars drilled in Xinjiang on all-PLA kit (Type 191 rifles, Type 08 IFVs, artillery, drones and counter-drone systems) in mixed teams under a single command — the first China-Pakistan regular-army exercise, in the military region that faces Ladakh — while the CPC's fifth plenum (26-29 October) ratified the expulsion of former CMC vice-chairman Zhang Youxia, ex-Joint Staff chief Liu Zhenli and fourteen other PLA figures, the deepest purge yet of the command that would run any LAC contingency. The MoD's September 'significant reduction' in PLA strength opposite the LAC stands on paper; the tent line is the fact on the ground. Managed in the west, unresolved in the east, with a decapitated Chinese high command and a rehearsed two-front ground component.

    assessment · as of 30 Oct 2026

    Elevated
  • LoC & Pakistan border

    No LoC ceasefire violation was reported in the window; the contest is rhetorical, nuclear-signalled and increasingly about where Rawalpindi's bandwidth goes. Rajnath Singh's 15 October warning that a Pakistan-origin terror attack would draw an 'even stronger response' than Operation Sindoor was answered in two steps — the Foreign Office calling it 'reckless' (16 October) and the National Strategic Command's Gen Aamer Raza telling Kakul cadets there is 'no space for conflict or war in a nuclearised environment' (17 October) — bracketed by the Fatah-2 ER test of 13 October (no range, speed or payload published, a week after the Fatah-IV ER cruise missile) and Lt Gen (retd) Kidwai's 20 October threat to 'review and reconsider' deployments over Indian SSBN patrols. Pakistan's other fronts are pulling the other way: governor's rule and an emergency in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa since 11 October, PTI's chief minister in custody and twelve border districts carved into a federally run secretariat; at least four exchanges of fire with the Afghan Taliban between 17 and 28 October (Kurram, Paktika, Angoor Adda, Torkham) with bilateral trade down 95%; the BLF's 'Operation Almas' at Gwadar on 22 October, which reached the perimeter of an FWO engineering camp at CPEC's showcase port whatever the disputed body count; and Field Marshal Munir's 23 October Peshawar vow to 'hit them hard wherever they are' as ISPR again brands the TTP an 'Indian proxy' — a charge India calls baseless, now carried within 48 hours by the prime minister's Apex Committee, the army chief and the routine operational communiqué. Munir, not the civilian government, then led the Makkah-pact bloc's first four-way sitting with Iran in Tehran on 26 October, and Pakistani forces remain deployed in Saudi Arabia under the pact. At sea PNS/M Hangor fired an unnamed anti-ship cruise missile on 27 September, five months after commissioning, while India's P-75I still has no CCS clearance; the PAF's Air Force Day footage confirmed an HQ-17AE/Korkut/Sahin hard-kill ring around the airbases India reached in May 2025. The army that would fight India is being stretched west, north and south — which cuts both ways for deterrence: less bandwidth for the eastern border, more incentive to externalise the domestic war onto India.

    assessment · as of 30 Oct 2026

    Elevated
  • Indian Ocean Region

    Hormuz is at its most dangerous point since February, and the week after the 3 November US midterms will decide which way it breaks. On 29 October the IRGC said three tankers exploded on mines on the 'unauthorised southern route' near Oman and a fourth burned east of the strait; the same evening UKMTO logged the first successful limpet-mine attack of the war, on the Louise 1 about 25 nm off Khasab; CENTCOM's claim to have cleared the main lanes (and helped export 1.5 billion barrels since summer) is met by an IRGC demand for 'independent evidence'. Daily transits are back in single digits, Brent is above $115, and the United States has reportedly told Gulf partners to prepare for a 'short, intense' campaign after the midterms — a Patriot battery moving from Texas, a second carrier strike group and a Marine Expeditionary Unit joining ~20 US warships in November — against a Qatar-brokered track (Vance's letter to Rezaei, mediators back in Tehran on 30 October) that has not moved Iran on enrichment. At Bab el-Mandeb the Houthis have held Perim Island since 11 September and the Hanish group since 14 September, so an Iran-aligned force sits on both gates of Gulf crude; their campaign on Saudi Arabia has become an interceptor drawdown — at least 20 ballistic missiles intercepted 20-29 October, eleven on 25 October alone, after the 10 October Riyadh airport strike killed 13. India's hardening is real but partial: LPG sources widened from 27 to 41 countries, 67% of imports now US-origin, domestic output up to 55,000 t/day (Puri, 27 October); the Quad foreign ministers met for the third time this year in Atlanta on 30-31 October with Hormuz shipping at the top of the sheet. The Navy's own window was productive — a French Rafale M made the first arrested landing on INS Vikrant on 29 October at the first attempt, opening the STOBAR trials behind the 26-jet, ₹63,000 crore buy; SIMBEX closed off Visakhapatnam on 26 October with a submarine, P-8I and MH-60R in the ASW serials; INS Sahyadri moved from INDRA with Russia to Busan within a week — and the CCS cleared eight Next Generation Corvettes (₹40,000+ crore) on 28 October. Still no P-75I signature while Pakistan's Hangor has fired; Mazagon Dock's Q2 profit fell 54% on ₹445 crore of provisions. China's Type 076 remains in trials with no Indian answer.

    assessment · as of 30 Oct 2026

    High activity
  • South China Sea / Taiwan strait

    The three weeks after Lai's National Day speech produced a posture rather than an exercise. The 12-17 October live-fire zones were coastal — Taipei itself noted three were in the Bohai and Yellow seas and the other two 159 and 588 nm away — but by 28 October Taiwan's NSC secretary-general Joseph Wu mapped 53 Chinese navy and official vessels from southern Japan past Taiwan to the Philippine Sea, 34 of them warships, the Liaoning group east of the Philippines and three formations off southern Japan: 'the simultaneous threat to Taiwan, Japan and the Philippines is obvious.' Japan's Joint Staff logged the first joint passage of a China Coast Guard cutter with three PLAN combatants through the Osumi Strait on 27 October, folding the grey-zone instrument into naval deployments. Beijing calls all of it routine; Xi's 23-26 September Washington visit bought only a two-month trade-truce extension (to 10 January) and an argument over whether the US 'opposes' or 'does not support' Taiwan independence, and the ~$14 bn Patriot/T-Dome package still awaits Trump's signature, with a US official putting the odds of splitting it 'way up'. The US-Japan answer was Keen Sword 27 (19-29 October): ~56,000 personnel, a rehearsed carrier-to-truck simulated anti-ship strike with CSG-9 and Marine NMESIS, Philippine troops at Ishigaki — though a typhoon cancelled the first planned NMESIS/MADIS delivery to Yonaguni, 110 km from Taiwan. In the South China Sea the 24 September Second Thomas Shoal blockade stands, and China sent only its defence attaché to ADMM-Plus in Cebu on 29 October, its lowest showing since 2010, blaming a 'self-serving' Philippine chair — a snub at the one standing forum where India, China, the US and Russia sit under an ASEAN gavel. The PLA high command that would run any of this lost its top tier at the fifth plenum (Zhang Youxia, Liu Zhenli and fourteen others expelled). Antelope Reef stands at its August baseline and the Type 076 Sichuan is still in trials. For India: BrahMos's first export customer is the state being squeezed, and a navy that can hold the arc from Kagoshima to Palawan for weeks without declaring a drill can do the same in the Bay of Bengal.

    assessment · as of 30 Oct 2026

    Elevated
  • Russia-Ukraine theatre

    The energy ceasefire Washington declared on 11 October is dead and the war heads into winter on strike-for-strike terms. Russia has fired more than 100 ballistic missiles at Kyiv and its region since 14 October by Zelensky's count; on 29 October a jet-powered drone hit Dnipro's railway platform (14 dead), ballistic missiles hit Kyiv that night and about 350,000 people around Dnipro lost power, with Energy Minister Shmyhal counting 350-plus attacks on energy infrastructure since September. Ukraine held off refineries for 72 hours — 'no one thanked us' — and resumed: Deputy PM Novak conceded on 30 October that 'attacks on refineries have resumed' after a fire at Rosneft's Novokuybyshevsk plant, while Storm Shadows hit the Energia thermal-battery plant at Yelets (25 October) and Proton-Elektroteks at Oryol (23 October), a deliberate attempt to choke the Iskander/Kinzhal/S-400 power-source chain rather than airfields or depots. The interceptor arithmetic is now a political dispute: Zelensky says Ukraine has received about 12 Patriots a month (24 in the last 90 days) and fired 35 in October, with 23 more sourced from third countries stuck awaiting US export approval; NATO sources told Euronews deliveries are being held until the 3 November midterms, which the alliance's top commander denies; US stocks were roughly halved by the Iran war and production runs ~60-65 a month. Diplomacy has a date in outline: after Witkoff's three hours with Putin on 21 October the Kremlin named 'around 10 November', probably Abu Dhabi, for the first trilateral round since Geneva; Zelensky has publicly offered a frozen line without recognition (19.3% occupied) against a Congress-ratified Article 5-style guarantee, while Peskov (30 October) rejects any ceasefire that gives Ukraine 'a respite' and the Donbas demand stands. The ground front is close to frozen — Putin's 16 October claim of 6,500 sq km this year against ISW's ~100 — and Russia's Pacific Fleet fired a Bulava from Generalissimus Suvorov on 28 October as a filmed readiness signal. The Graham sanctions act's 100% tariff instrument against Russian-crude buyers stands unused while the US Treasury has licensed Russian diesel imports to April 2027. For India: spares-and-support risk on Russian-origin platforms, the live lesson that magazine depth and licensed interceptor production are survival math, and a Washington that sanctions and buys from Moscow in the same month.

    assessment · as of 30 Oct 2026

    High activity
  • Middle East

    Two wars, no ceasefire on either, and a decision clock set by the US midterms. US-Iran: the strait is mined again by Iran's own account (three tankers on mines 29 October, a limpet attack on the Louise 1 off Khasab — the first of its kind since February), the enrichment stalemate is intact — Rezaei told Field Marshal Munir on 20 October 'not even a small quantity' of enriched material will leave Iran — and Vance's letter via Qatar has produced talks about talks, with Qatari mediators back in Tehran on 30 October and Axios reporting disagreement over the preconditions. Against that, Gulf states have reportedly been warned to prepare for a 'short, intense' US campaign after 3 November, with infrastructure and nuclear sites (Pickaxe Mountain) the discussed targets and a Patriot battery, a second carrier group and a MEU moving in; Trump says only that the war will end 'soon'. Yemen: the Houthis hold Perim and the Hanish islands astride Bab el-Mandeb and are bleeding Saudi interceptor stocks — at least 20 ballistic missiles intercepted 20-29 October, eleven on 25 October, the day Riyadh's airport reopened after the 10 October strike that killed 13; 45% of flights out of the kingdom cancelled, Brent above $115. The Makkah pact is now a regional fact: Pakistani forces are deployed in Saudi Arabia, Turkey's parliament is still ratifying, and on 26 October Munir, Prince Khalid bin Salman and Turkey's intelligence chief held the bloc's first collective sitting with Iran in Tehran — proposed by Pakistan's army, not its government — producing only an agreement to keep talking. Israel's 27 October election ended in deadlock (Netanyahu bloc 53, Eisenkot 48, Arab lists a record 19), leaving a caretaker government to weigh renewed strikes on Iran with Washington. The Lebanon and Gaza ceasefires continue to erode at the edges with no verified major break. For India: fuel exposure hardened but not removed (LPG sources 27 to 41 countries, 67% US-origin), diaspora still within Iranian and Houthi reach, and a Pakistani army now carrying Riyadh's security conversation in person.

    assessment · as of 30 Oct 2026

    High activity

Deals in motion

Procurement pipeline

Procurement pipeline
Program Stage Value Detail Source
Project-75I submarines (6× TKMS–MDL) Approved ₹70,000 crore (reports run to ₹90,000 cr with ToT scope) Finance Ministry cleared the six-boat thyssenkrupp–Mazagon Dock programme on 28-29 May and negotiations are complete, but the signature keeps slipping: Germany's ambassador said on 23 Sep Berlin will sign 'at any moment', the Defence Secretary called it 'at the final stage' on 1 Oct, and the CCS that cleared ₹40,000+ crore of Next Generation Corvettes on 28 Oct did not clear P-75(I) — no approval announced by 30 Oct. The comparison has sharpened: Pakistan's lead Hangor boat fired a live anti-ship cruise missile on 27 Sep, five months after commissioning, and Mazagon Dock's Q2 profit fell 54% on ₹445 crore of provisions (27 Oct), an execution question for the yard the contract depends on; first boat due seven years after signature, DRDO AIP to be fitted to a submarine in refit around mid-2027 as of 30 Oct 2026 ↗
MRFA — 114 Rafale fighters Negotiation ₹3.25 lakh crore (~$34–39 bn reported) Dassault's techno-commercial proposal (6-7 Aug) is with the MoD Acquisition Wing and the IAF: 114 jets within the DAC-cleared ₹3.25 lakh crore, a first tranche fly-away (18-20 reported) and the rest built in India with a Tata final-assembly line, indigenous content rising from 40% to 60%; on 3 Oct Air Chief Marshal A.P. Singh said price negotiations and other critical issues are under way and the deal could be finalised by the end of FY2026-27 if plans hold — he also floated buying another platform if AMCA slips as of 22 Oct 2026 ↗
AMCA fifth-generation fighter Development ₹15,000 crore (prototype phase); engine ₹30,000–61,000 cr reported Government has chosen not to hedge: on 1 Oct the Defence Secretary said India is 'putting all our eggs in this basket' and has taken no decision on any foreign fifth-generation jet (Su-57 offer still on the table). The ₹15,000 crore prototype RFP (five flying prototypes, one structural test airframe, 1,800 sorties in 84 months, Puttaparthi facility, first flight within 30 months of contract — Defence Secretary's target Sep 2028) closed at 3 pm on 30 Oct after two extensions; ADA opens technical bids on 31 Oct and partner selection is expected Feb–Mar 2027. Bidders are Tata Advanced Systems (solo), an L&T–BEL–Dynamatic consortium and a Bharat Forge–BEML–Data Patterns team (50:30:20), with HAL not shortlisted — the winner must form an Indian-majority company within three months and becomes the first private lead of an Indian fighter. ACM A.P. Singh said on 3 Oct the IAF 'may have to look at other options' if AMCA slips and later conceded the first-flight date will not hold; GCAP's pull on Canada and Germany after FCAS's collapse is the comparison. Mk1 flies on the GE F414; the Mk2 engine race (Safran–GTRE clean-sheet ~120 kN vs the Rolls-Royce–Reliance offer) still has no announced CCS clearance as of 30 Oct 2026 ↗
Tejas Mk1A fighters (83 + 97 follow-on) Ongoing ₹46,898 cr (83 jets, 2021) + ₹62,370 cr (97 jets, 2025) The original 40-jet Mk1 order closed on 18 Sep with the last two FOC trainers, ten years past its deadline; the Mk1A order it was meant to precede has still produced no accepted aircraft by 30 Oct. The engine gate is opening — GE shipped four F404-IN20s in September after three in August, taking the count to 14 of 99, with eight more targeted by year-end (22) and 30 a year reported from 2027 — but the integration gate is closing more slowly: Vice Chief Ashutosh Dixit said on 22 Sep 'only two or three points' of radar-missile integration remain, to be cleared 'within a month or two', which puts a first handover around the turn of the year. Dixit, a test pilot identified with the Tejas, takes over as Chief of the Air Staff on 31 Oct. HAL's annual report targets 25 Mk1A deliveries by Mar 2027; the 97-jet second batch is scheduled Sep 2027–Sep 2033 and the Nashik third line takes LCA capacity to 24 a year, so 180 jets in seven years leaves no slack as of 30 Oct 2026 ↗
Anant Shastra QRSAM (Army air defence) Negotiation ₹30,000 crore ($3.2–3.6 bn) Contract still unsigned: BEL's guidance ranges from 'mid-to-late 2026' to 'by the end of FY2026-27' (5-10% risk of slipping to July 2027), with the first production-standard system due 18 months after signature — so first induction now reads late 2027 to 2028, not FY2027; BEL has set aside 75 ha and ₹562 crore at Chitrakoot in the UP corridor for the line, and the 25 Aug blanket approval to transfer every DRDO conventional-missile technology to Indian industry (PIB PRID 2303014) widens the eventual production base beyond the BEL–BDL–L&T consortium as of 4 Sept 2026 ↗
Project 17A Nilgiri-class frigates Completed — INS Mahendragiri — sixth and final ship — commissioned into the Eastern Fleet at Visakhapatnam on 11 Jul, closing out the class: six frigates inducted in ~18 months, launch-to-delivery halved to 31 months; indigenous content >75% as of 11 Jul 2026 ↗
Next Generation Corvettes (8× GRSE/GSL) Approved ₹40,000+ crore (8 ships; GRSE share ~₹33,000 cr per investor communication) CCS cleared the Navy's in-house-designed Next Generation Corvette on 28 Oct, four years after the June 2022 AoN at ~₹36,000 crore: GRSE (L1 at the 21 May 2025 bid opening) builds five and Goa Shipyard three at the same unit cost; officials said contracts would be signed within days — none announced by 30 Oct; ~2,000 t by ANI's account (larger by others), ~30 kt, multi-role ASuW/ASW/AAW hulls for surface action group, escort and coastal-defence roles to replace the Khukri and Kora classes; first ship targeted 2030, no construction start date, weapons and sensor fit unannounced as of 30 Oct 2026 ↗
Projects 15C / 17B / 18A surface combatants Tender ≈₹1 lakh crore (reported); naval AoN pipeline ≈₹2.41 trillion The 16-hull plan (4 next-gen destroyers ₹50,000 cr, 6 stealth frigates ₹40,000 cr split MDL–GRSE, 6 Large Surface Combatants of 14,000–15,000 t) has started to convert: the Vice Chief said on 19 Oct that an RFP for the next-generation frigate went out in early October and responses are awaited, putting 42 naval vessels on order and AoN-approved but uncontracted platforms — 78 ships and submarines plus 120 fast interceptor craft — at about ₹2.41 trillion, with AoN also for a 24-28 MW indigenous marine gas turbine under Make. The 26 Oct DAC's unnamed 'other major naval platforms' are reported to include the Project-18A next-generation destroyer of over 10,000 t (~₹75,000 cr by one account, not itemised by the ministry), and the CCS cleared the eight Next Generation Corvettes on 28 Oct — conversion pace, not demand, remains the figure to watch as of 30 Oct 2026 ↗
Landing Platform Docks (4× ~30,000 t) Tender ≈₹50,000 crore (~$5.26 bn reported) RFP issued to shortlisted Indian yards in the week before 19 Oct — the first priced requirement since the 2013 tender was withdrawn in 2020: four ships of 30,000+ t and ~220 m, lift for 900 troops with vehicles, tanks and artillery, deck and hangar for two heavy-lift and twelve special-operations helicopters, electric propulsion drawing on the GE Vernova–BHEL land-based test facility; they would be the largest indigenous combat vessels after INS Vikrant. Yards unnamed, no bid deadline public, no steel cut — the programme has stalled at exactly this stage before as of 22 Oct 2026 ↗
DAC capital-acquisition tranches (Jul + Sep + Oct 2026) Approved ≈₹3.74 lakh crore (₹52,000 cr on 3 Jul + ₹1.10 lakh cr on 7 Sep + ₹2.12 lakh cr on 26 Oct) The 26 Oct sitting — about ₹2,12,000 crore, 82% earmarked for Indian industry, one of the largest single-sitting approvals on record — nearly doubled the September round: ten Army items (High Mobility Vehicles, a Self-Propelled Tracked Gun System reported as 335 more K9 Vajra-T, Gun Shot Response System, Light Multi Role Helicopters, VSHORADS, platform-based counter-UAS, a long-range UAS 'brick', surveillance UAV, integrated surveillance-and-strike system, long-range kamikaze drones); Navy Active Offboard Decoy System plus unnamed 'other major naval platforms' reported to include a >10,000-t Project-18A destroyer; IAF helicopters including Special Utility Helicopters reported as 24 VVIP aircraft (~₹10,000 cr), air-defence systems, weapons and mobile X-band weather radars. Three rounds have now signalled ≈₹3.74 lakh crore of intent against the ₹2.19 lakh crore FY27 capital outlay — AoNs, not contracts; the Defence Secretary separately said on 23 Oct that drones, counter-drone kit, mobile artillery and mobile radars are being bought under emergency procurement. July's items (Akash Tarang, MPATGM, MRSAM, V-SHORADS, kamikaze drones, naval mines, FW-HAPS) and September's (CBRN recce vehicles, mine layers, Sarvatra bridges, a large ALH buy, Arudhra radars, marine gas turbines, jammers) stand as of 30 Oct 2026 ↗
Project Kusha LR-SAM (XRSAM) Development ₹21,700 crore (5 IAF squadrons) Maiden flight 23 Jul from Abdul Kalam Island destroyed an electronic target simulating a high-speed, high-altitude threat — missile, radars and command centre all DRDO-built; the M1/M2/M3 interceptors of ~150/250/350 km range are to give the S-400 tier an indigenous successor; live-target and user trials still ahead as of 23 Jul 2026 ↗
Su-30MKI upgrade + 12 new-build (Nashik) Planned ≈₹60,000 crore (reported) Still no formal contract or MoD sanction for the 12 attrition-replacement jets or the two-phase upgrade, but the engine constraint eased on 6 Oct: at Koraput's 2,000th-engine rollout Rajnath Singh announced a ₹553 crore expansion that lifts AL-31FP output from 30 to 50 a year (₹335 cr) and adds a second Shakti line of up to 100 helicopter engines by 2028-29 (₹218 cr); the Sep 2024 order for 240 AL-31FPs (~₹26,000 cr, 63 delivered vs 60 due by year two) can now close in roughly 3.5 years instead of six, with indigenous content headed to 63%; on 30 Oct the outgoing Air Chief told Vayu the upgrade (new radar, EW suite, avionics, mission systems and weapons, indigenous systems at the core) has an AoN, work has begun and the case is being processed through the Department of Defence Production for the CCS — the first file on ACM Dixit's desk as of 30 Oct 2026 ↗
MTA — 60 medium transport aircraft Tender ≈₹1 lakh crore (~$10 bn) RFP issued 12 Aug to Indian primes for 60 aircraft (18–30 t, with options beyond) to replace the AN-32: each bidder must pair with a foreign OEM and set up Indian final assembly plus MRO, ~20% delivered fly-away; Tata–Lockheed (C-130J), Mahindra–Embraer (C-390) and a revived HAL–Russia MTA lead the field as of 12 Aug 2026 ↗
IMRH 13-t helicopter + Aravalli engine (HAL–Safran) Development ₹13,500 crore (IMRH D&D case, reported); engine contract value undisclosed HAL and Safran Helicopter Engines signed the final contract with their 50:50 SAFHAL JV on 26 Aug to design, develop, manufacture and support the 3,500–4,000 shp Aravalli turboshaft for the 13-t IMRH (Mi-17 replacement) and 12.5-t DBMRH — Safran's first co-development of an engine in this class, to be built at Tumakuru, development running to 2032-33; the ~₹13,500 crore IMRH design-and-development case for a ~350-helicopter requirement is reported to be headed for the CCS, with HAL planning ~₹12,000 crore of manufacturing investment by 2030 — contract value, IP terms and milestones undisclosed as of 3 Sept 2026 ↗

Force strength

Fleet watch

Fleet watch
Force Holding Strength Note Source
Indian Air Force Fighter squadrons ~29 (vs 42 sanctioned) Lowest since the mid-1960s; independent assessments range 29-31. Recovery hinges on Tejas Mk1A/Mk2 deliveries and the 114-jet MRFA buy. as of 18 Apr 2026 ↗
Indian Navy Warships in service 130-140 Five indigenous warships (two P-17A frigates, one survey vessel, two ASW shallow-water craft) commissioned in June 2026 alone; a new hull joins roughly every 40 days, targeting ~175 ships by 2035. as of 4 Jun 2026 ↗
Indian Navy Conventional attack submarines 16 6 Kalvari (Scorpene) + 6 Sindhughosh (Kilo) + 4 Shishumar (HDW), plus 3 Arihant-class SSBNs; the ageing line is to be recapitalised by six P-75I AIP boats from TKMS-Mazagon Dock. as of 30 Nov 2025 ↗
China PLAN Battle force ships 370+ World's largest navy by hull count per the Pentagon's China Military Power Report; projected to reach 435 ships by 2030. as of 18 Dec 2024 ↗
Pakistan Air Force JF-17 Thunder fleet 175 Backbone of the PAF: 50 Block 1, 62 Block 2, 26 twin-seat JF-17B, 42 Block 3 (8 more on order); complemented by 20 J-10CE of 36 ordered. as of 3 Jul 2026 ↗
Indian Air Force S-400 squadrons 4 of 5 delivered Fourth squadron arrived by ship in early June 2026 and awaits operational deployment; the fifth and final unit under the $5.43B 2018 contract is expected in the coming months. as of 4 Jun 2026 ↗

Signed & cleared

Recent deals